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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Sixth Amendment grants everyone the fundamental right to a 
speedy trial.1 It is our constitutional right to be charged and tried in an 
efficient and expeditious manner.2 This right is also protected by a 
federal statute, the Speedy Trial Act.3 While it would seem that this 
right is well-protected by both constitutional and federal law, in 
practice, it may not be. Many claims for a violation of one’s right to a 
speedy trial have been ignored; for example, in one Seventh Circuit 
case, the trial did not commence for over 430 days from the date of the 
charge.4 One reason that the Seventh Circuit affirms these lengthy 
delays is because it has been liberal with its application of the 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Editor-in-Chief, 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–30 (1972) 
(stating that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
3 Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3162 (2006). 
4 See United States v. Cunningham, 393 F. App’x 403, 405–06 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(where 430 days passed between the indictment and trial but the Act was not 
violated because the court invoked the ends-of-justice exception). 
 114
1
Winings: What Does Speed Have to Do with It?: An Analysis of the Seventh C
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
excludable days exception provided in the Speedy Trial Act,5 as well 
as with what is considered a reasonable amount of time to bring the 
defendant to trial.6 Another reason is the lack of an efficient analytical 
standard for courts to use to determine if a violation of one’s right to a 
speedy trial occurred. The Seventh Circuit also chooses to affirm 
dismissal without prejudice a majority of the time, which allows the 
defendant to be reprosecuted, even though the Speedy Trial Act has 
been violated.7 As a result of the Seventh Circuit’s approach, 
defendants are tried well after what is required by the Speedy Trial 
Act, and those at fault for the delay are not punished.  
This Note will examine the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the 
Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act, in light of the precedent 
passed down from the Supreme Court. The Seventh Circuit’s 
application of the right to a speedy trial will also be compared to the 
approach of the other circuit courts. This analysis helps to establish a 
theory that the right to a speedy trial may be more myth than reality in 
actual practice within the Seventh Circuit. While a bright-line rule of 
when a person’s right to a speedy trial has been violated may not be 
feasible, a more workable standard must be developed. The Seventh 
Circuit must find a way to balance one’s individual rights with the 
public interest. In addition, the Seventh Circuit must provide a 
meaningful remedy when a violation occurs, as well as deter violations 
through sanctions. This Note attempts to provide a balancing structure 
for these rights, as well as to recommend a better approach to provide 
a meaningful remedy for the violation of the right to a speedy trial.  
 
 
                                                 
5 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(1)(A)–(H) (excluding some days from the seventy-
day requirement). 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 305–06 (7th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 1087, 1089 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Arango, 879 
F.2d 1501, 1507-08 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 511 
(7th Cir. 1988). 
7 See Hills, 618 F.3d at 631–32.  
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I. BACKGROUND 
  
 A defendant’s right to a speedy trial is protected by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and by federal statute.8 
The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly analyzed the right under both 
contexts to determine if a violation of one’s right to a speedy trial 
occurred and to decide whether to dismiss with or without prejudice.9 
 
A. A Constitutional Right: The Sixth Amendment 
 
 While public policy should, and does, shape our laws and the way 
they are applied, our Founding Fathers established certain 
constitutional rights that were considered fundamental and were to be 
left untouched and unlimited.10 One of these constitutional rights is the 
right to a speedy trial and is found in the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.11 The Sixth Amendment was put in place 
“(1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration[,] (2) to minimize 
anxiety and concern of the accused[,] and (3) to limit the possibility 
that defense will be impaired.”12 In light of these factors, one can infer 
that the Founding Fathers thought that the right to a speedy trial was 
necessary and fundamental to preserve our rights and liberty as 
individuals.  
The federal government has further expressed and defined this 
right through a statute, the Speedy Trial Act.13 However, the Speedy 
Trial Act does not, and indeed cannot, limit the Sixth Amendment’s 
                                                 
8 People v. Phipps, 933 N.E.2d 1186, 1192–93 (Ill. 2010); see U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI; 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006).  
9 See Sykes, 614 F.3d at 305–06; Hills, 618 F.3d at 631–32; Killingsworth, 507 
F.3d at 1087; Arango, 879 F.2d at 1501; Fountain, 840 F.2d at 509. 
10 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–30 (1972) 
(stating that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right). 
11 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . .”). 
12 Hills, 618 F.3d at 631–32. 
13 Phipps, 933 N.E.2d at 1192–93. 
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guarantee of a speedy trial.14 As a result, courts must remember that 
the right they are ensuring is one guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution. 
 
B. A Statutory Right: The Speedy Trial Act 
 
The Speedy Trial Act assures that the defendant receives a speedy 
trial by setting out time limits in which the trial must occur.15 Under 
the Act, any information or indictment “shall be filed within thirty 
days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served 
with a summons.”16 In addition, the trial of a defendant shall occur 
within seventy days from the date of the indictment.17   
However, there are some periods of time that are considered 
excluded.18  
 
The following periods of delay shall be excluded in 
computing the time within which an information or an 
indictment must be filed, or in computing the time within 
which the trial of any such offense must commence:  
 
(1) any period of delay resulting from other proceedings 
concerning the defendant, including but not limited to  
 
 (A) delay resulting from any proceeding . . . to determine 
the mental competency or physical capacity of the defendant;  
 
 (B) delay resulting from trial with respect to other 
charges against the defendant;  
 
 (C) delay resulting from any interlocutory appeal;  
                                                 
14 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
15 Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006). 
16 Id. § 3161(b). 
17 Id. § 3161(c)(1). 
18 Id. § 3161(h). 
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 (D) delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the 
filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, 
or other prompt disposition of, such motion;  
 
 (E) delay resulting from any proceeding relating to the 
transfer of a case or the removal of any defendant from 
another district . . .;  
 
 (F) delay resulting from transportation of any defendant  
. . .;  
 
 (G) delay resulting from consideration by the court of a 
proposed plea agreement . . .; and  
 
 (H) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to 
exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding concerning 
the defendant is actually under advisement by the court.19 
 
In addition, a period of delay to allow the defendant to demonstrate his 
good conduct and a “period of delay resulting from the absence or 
unavailability of the defendant or an essential witness” are excluded.20 
Futhermore, delay because a continuance is granted by a judge on his 
own motion or at the request of the defendant or government is also 
excluded.21  
If the time limit governing when an indictment or information can 
be filed is violated, the charge “shall be dismissed or otherwise 
dropped.”22 If the time limit required by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) is 
violated, the indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the 
defendant.23 When the court is determining whether to dismiss with or 
without prejudice, it shall consider “the seriousness of the offense[,] 
                                                 
19 Id. §§ 3161(h)(1)(A)–(H). 
20 Id. §§ 3161(h)(2), (3)(A). 
21 Id. § 3161(7)(A). 
22 Id. § 3162(a)(1). 
23 Id. § 3162(a)(2). 
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the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal[,] 
and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of [the Act] 
and on the administration of justice.”24 These factors seem to almost 
always favor dismissal without prejudice in the Seventh Circuit.  
In United States v. Taylor, the Supreme Court reviewed the 
Speedy Trial Act’s legislative history and determined that prejudice to 
the defendant is a substantial factor in determining whether to dismiss 
with or without prejudice as well.25 The Supreme Court also 
determined that the legislative history shows that Congress did not 
intend for a certain type of dismissal to be the presumptive remedy for 
a Speedy Trial Act violation.26 Instead, courts have significant 
discretion when deciding if a violation occurred and whether to 
dismiss with or without prejudice.27  
The Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo has provided insight into 
the policy reasons behind the Sixth Amendment Right to a speedy 
trial.28 These same policy reasons, as well as the Sixth Amendment, 
helped to shape the Speedy Trial Act. One important policy concern is 
that the accused be treated with “decent and fair procedures”; 
however, there is also a societal interest in providing a speedy trial.29 
When courts are unable to provide a speedy trial, the defendant may 
gain an advantage.30 For example, defendants may be able to negotiate 
more effectively or manipulate the system, and those who are out on 
bond have the opportunity to commit additional crimes.31 In addition, 
lengthy delays could have detrimental effects on defendants’ 
rehabilitation because they are often confined for long periods of 
time.32 Defendants could also use delay as a tactic by waiting until 
                                                 
24 Id. 
25 487 U.S. 326, 333 (1988). 
26 Id. at 334. 
27 United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 1988). 
28 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972). 
29 Id.  
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 520 (this also contributes to prison overcrowding). 
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witnesses are unavailable or their memories fade.33 As a result, in 
addition to protecting the defendant’s rights, the Speedy Trial Act 
serves an important societal function. 
 
C. The Supreme Court’s Application of the Sixth Amendment and the 
Speedy Trial Act 
 
 In United States v. Taylor, the Supreme Court stated that:  
 
[A] district court must carefully consider those factors as 
applied to the particular case and, whatever its decision, 
clearly articulate their effect in order to permit meaningful 
appellate review. Only then can an appellate court ascertain 
whether a district court has ignored or slighted a factor that 
Congress has deemed pertinent to the choice of remedy, 
thereby failing to act within the limits prescribed by 
Congress.34 
 
The Supreme Court in Taylor also stated that “the district court’s 
judgment of how opposing considerations balance should not be 
lightly disturbed.”35 If the district court does not articulate the reasons 
for its decision, the appellate courts and Supreme Court are put in a 
difficult position. Do they act with deference or do they analyze the 
facts and circumstances of the case to decide how they would hold? 
The following cases demonstrate the approach that the Supreme Court 
has taken with regard to the right to a speedy trial.  
 
1. Vermont v. Brillon 
 
In Vermont v. Brillon, the defendant was arrested for felony 
domestic assault and habitual offender charges and was tried three 
                                                 
33 Id. at 521. 
34 487 U.S. 326, 336–37 (1988). 
35 Id. 
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years later.36 The defendant was convicted of second-degree 
aggravated domestic assault in the district court.37 The Vermont 
Supreme Court vacated, and the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.38 The Supreme Court then reversed and remanded.39    
During his trial, Brillon was appointed at least six different 
attorneys.40 The United States Supreme Court noted that assigned 
counsel acts on behalf of their clients, just as retained counsel does, 
and that delays sought by counsel are usually attributable to their 
clients.41 The Court stated that the Vermont Supreme Court erred 
when it attributed to the State the failure of assigned counsel to mov
the defendant’s case forward.
e 
ruptive 
                                                
42 The Vermont Supreme Court also 
failed to properly take into account the role of Brillon’s dis
behavior.43 The Supreme Court held that delays caused by defense 
counsel, including appointed counsel, were attributable to the 
defendant and that Brillon was not denied his constitutional right to a 
speedy trial.44   
 
2. Barker v. Wingo  
 
In Barker v. Wingo, the defendant, a state prisoner, challenged his 
conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding.45 The district court denied 
 
36 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1287 (2009).  
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 1283.  
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 1287.  
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 1291. 
43 Id. at 1292 (“His strident, aggressive behavior with regard to [his third 
counsel], whom he threatened, further impeded prompt trial and likely made it more 
difficult for the Defender General’s office to find replacement counsel.”). 
44 Id. at 1293. 
45 407 U.S. 514 (1972).  
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the petition, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.46 The Supreme Court also 
affirmed.47 
The Supreme Court laid out four factors to determine if a 
defendant had been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy 
trial: “Length of [the] delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s 
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.”48 Unless the 
delay is “presumptively prejudicial,” there is no need to analyze the 
other factors.49 The Supreme Court then stated that these factors must 
be “considered together with such other circumstances as may be 
relevant.”50   
The Supreme Court determined that a delay between arrest and 
trial of well over five years was extraordinary, but that two other 
factors outweighed this deficiency.51 First, the defendant suffered 
minimal prejudice.52 Second, the Court inferred that the defendant did 
not want a speedy trial because he did not assert his right for four 
years.53 The Court noted that while the Commonwealth of Kentucky 
was granted sixteen continuances, Barker did not object until the 
twelfth.54 The Commonwealth was then granted additional 
continuances to which Barker did not object.55  
In addition, the Court noted that delay could often be used as a 
defense tactic and that a violation of one’s right to a speedy trial does 
not per se prejudice the defendant.56 The Court rejected outright “the 
rule that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives 
                                                 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 530.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 533 (leaving the factors open-ended).  
51 Id. at 533–34.  
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 516–17.  
55 Id. at 517.  
56 Id.  
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his right.”57 The Court stated that the better rule is one where the 
defendant’s assertion or failure to assert his right is a factor to be 
considered.58 This places “the primary burden on the courts and the 
prosecutors to assure that cases are brought to trial.”59 The Court 
stated that unless there were extraordinary circumstances, it would be 
disinclined to rule that a defendant was denied his rights if the 
defendant failed to object to continuances and did not want a speedy 
trial.60 As a result, the Supreme Court held that Barker was not 
deprived of his right to a speedy trial.61   
  
3. United States v. Taylor  
 
In United States v. Taylor, the defendant was indicted for 
conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute.62 The district 
court dismissed the indictment with prejudice, and the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.63 The Supreme Court reversed.64 
The Supreme Court stated that “review must serve to ensure that 
the purposes of the [Speedy Trial] Act and the legislative compromise 
it reflects are given effect.”65 The Court noted that the trial was 
delayed for numerous reasons, including the defendant’s obligation to 
testify in another trial and slow processing by the trial court and the 
Government.66 The Court also analyzed the factors laid out in Barker 
and noted that the defendant’s alleged crime was serious, the 
Government’s conduct was lackadaisical, and the defendant failed to 
                                                 
57 Id. at 528.  
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 529.  
60 Id. at 536.  
61 Id. 
62 487 U.S. 326, 329 (1988).  
63 Id. at 326.  
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 336.  
66 Id. at 328. 
 123
10
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 5
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/5
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
appear for trial.67 The Supreme Court also stated that the district court 
did not provide explanations for its findings with regard to these 
factors, and it did not consider each of the necessary factors.68 The 
Supreme Court pointed out that the district court did not make a 
finding of prejudice and that while that is not dispositive, it is a factor 
that favors reprosecution.69  
The Court criticized the district court’s reasoning by stating that 
the deterrent effect of barring reprosecution70 should not alone support 
a decision to dismiss with prejudice because it would make all the 
other factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) superfluous.71 The Supreme 
Court stated that the district court abused its discretion because it did 
not weigh the factors correctly, it failed to explain why the 
Government was lackadaisical, it failed to consider that the defendant 
did not suffer prejudice, and it failed to take into account the 
defendant’s contribution to the delays.72 As a result, the Supreme 
Court reversed and held that no violation of the Speedy Trial Act 
occurred.73 
 
D. Other Circuits’ Application of the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy 
Trial Act 
 
Just as it is important for the Supreme Court to act with deference 
to the district courts, it is important for the federal courts of appeals to 
do so as well. It is also necessary for the district courts to fully explain 
their reasoning so that the courts of appeals can provide meaningful 
                                                 
67 Id. at 338–40.  
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 341.  
70 Id. at 342 (where the district court’s decision to dismiss with prejudice was 
heavily influenced by the court’s concern that not to do so would condone the 
Government’s behavior). 
71 Id. at 342.  
72 Id. at 343.  
73 Id.  
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review.74 The following cases illustrate the other circuit courts’ 
application of both the Sixth Amendment right75 and the statutory 
right76 to a speedy trial.  
 
1. The Third Circuit 
 
In United States v. Stradford, Stradford and two co-defendants 
were charged with defrauding multiple lending agencies and engaging 
in other financial fraud.77 The district court denied Stradford’s motion 
to dismiss the indictment on Speedy Trial Act grounds, and the Third 
Circuit affirmed.78   
The magistrate judge granted a continuance so that the parties 
could conduct plea discussions.79 The government required Stradford 
to consent to excluding that time for the purpose of the Speedy Trial 
Act if they were to discuss a plea bargain.80 Before the discussions 
began, Stradford filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for violations 
of the Speedy Trial Act.81 The district court denied Stradford’s 
motion.82 The Third Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation 
of the Speedy Trial Act de novo, the factual findings for clear error, 
and the decision granting a continuance for an abuse of discretion.83   
The Third Circuit noted that one of the enumerated exceptions for 
the Speedy Trial Act that allows for time to be excluded is “‘[a]ny 
period of delay resulting from a continuance . . . if the judge granted 
such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice 
served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public 
                                                 
74 Id. at 336–37. 
75 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
76 See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006). 
77 No. 08-3256, 2010 WL 3622995, at *1 (3d Cir. Sept. 20, 2010). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at *2. 
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and the defendant in a speedy trial.’”84 Stradford argued that the 
continuance order was invalid because it contained inaccurate 
statements; however, the court stated that the reference to the wrong 
name was just careless error and the fact that the negotiations were not 
clearly in progress as the order stated did not matter.85 The 
continuance order was not invalidated because the district court had 
set forth its reasons for granting the ends-of-justice continuance as was 
required by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).86 As a result, the Third Circuit 
held that a Speedy Trial Act violation did not occur.87  
 
2. The Fifth Circuit 
 
In United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, the defendant was 
convicted in the district court for possession of methamphetamine with 
intent to distribute.88 Defendant “moved to dismiss the indictment on 
grounds that his rights under the Speedy Trial Act had been 
violated.”89 The district court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
because the Speedy Trial Act was not violated.90 The time it took to 
dispose of the oral motion for detention was considered excludable 
under § 3161(h)(1)(D) of the Act.91 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction.92 
The Government made an oral motion for detention with the 
district court.93 The Fifth Circuit stated that “the day on which a 
pretrial motion is made and the day on which the hearing is held are 
both excluded for purposes of computing excludable delay under 18 
                                                 
84 Id. (citing Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) (2006)).  
85 Id. at *3.   
86 Id. at *3–4. 
87 Id. at *4. 
88 621 F.3d 354, 357 (5th Cir. 2010). 
89 Id. at 359. 
90 Id. 
91 Id.  
92 Id. at 358. 
93 Id. 
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U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D).”94 The court noted that the Guidelines to the 
Administration of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 recognize the starting 
date as the date that the motion is filed or made orally.95 “[T]he 
purpose of § 3161(h)(1)(D) is to ‘exclude all time that is consumed in 
placing the trial court in a position to dispose of a motion[.]’”96 The 
court saw no reason why an excludable delay would not be triggered 
by an oral motion in light of the purpose of the section.97 Therefore, 
the time that the district court took to decide the pretrial motion was 
excludable.98 As a result, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
holding that the Speedy Trial Act had not been violated.99 
 
3. The Eighth Circuit 
 
In United States v. Orozco-Osbaldo, the defendant was charged 
with conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine.100 The 
defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss 
for violation of the Speedy Trial Act.101 The Eighth Circuit affirmed 
the dismissal because the time spent by the district court considering 
joinder of defendants was prompt disposition of a pretrial motion.102   
The Eighth Circuit stated that the district court was correct to 
exclude the time during which it considered a motion for joinder 
because it was excludable under § 3161(h)(1)(D) of the Act.103 The 
court considered it to be a “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, 
from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, 
                                                 
94 Id. at 368. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 368–69. 
97 Id. at 369. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 615 F.3d 955, 956–57 (8th Cir. 2010). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 957–58. 
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or other prompt disposition of, such motion.”104 As a result, the time 
was excludable, and there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act.105 
 
4. The Ninth Circuit 
 
In United States v. Boyd, the defendant was convicted of 
“possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute . . . [,] 
possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense . . . [,] 
and being a felon in possession of a firearm.”106 The defendant 
appealed the decision of the district court, claiming a violation of the 
Speedy Trial Act.107 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the 
district court.108  
The defendant claimed that his rights under the Speedy Trial Act 
were violated because the government colluded with state authorities 
to delay his prosecution in an effort to buy time until a federal 
indictment could be obtained.109 In affirming the district court, the 
Ninth Circuit stated that any delays by the state in prosecuting were in 
good faith.110 In addition, the Ninth Circuit stated that while it 
disapproved of the same prosecutor bringing both state and federal 
claims for the same conduct (as had occurred in this case), “the district 
court did not clearly err in finding that no collusion occurred here.”111 
As a result, the Ninth Circuit agreed that no violation of the Speedy 
Trial Act occurred.112 
 
                                                 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 392 F. App’x 595, 596 (9th Cir. 2010). 
107 Id.  
108 Id. at 597. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. (meaning that the prosecution did not intentionally delay the trial 
because any delay was done for the benefit of the trial). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
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E. The Seventh Circuit’s Application of the Sixth Amendment and the 
Speedy Trial Act 
 
The Seventh Circuit has decided multiple cases that required an 
analysis of the Speedy Trial Act.113 Many of the cases required review 
to determine if the district court correctly decided to dismiss with or 
without prejudice.114 The Supreme Court in Taylor stated that the 
district court should “clearly articulate” the reasons for its decision 
because a district court’s judgment “should not be lightly 
disturbed.”115 As a result, the Seventh Circuit has the challenging task 
of balancing the necessary factors to determine if the district court 
abused its discretion, as well as determining if a violation of the 
Speedy Trial Act warrants dismissal with or without prejudice.       
In the cases discussed below, the Seventh Circuit determined that 
only dismissal without prejudice should be granted despite the fact that 
there were lengthy delays and laziness on the part of the 
prosecution.116 However, if lengthy delays and laziness on the part of 
the prosecution does not warrant dismissal with prejudice, what does? 
The following section of this Note begins with an analysis of the 
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation, in five different cases, of the Supreme 
Court’s analysis. It will then discuss the similarities and differences 
among the Seventh Circuit, the other circuits, and the Supreme Court 
in their application of the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act. 
 
 
 
                                                 
113 See, e.g., United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 305–06 (7th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 1087, 1088 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Arango, 879 
F.2d 1501, 1507 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 511 (7th 
Cir. 1988). 
114 Id. 
115 United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 335–37 (1988). 
116 See, e.g., Sykes, 614 F.3d at 305–06; Hills, 618 F.3d at 631–32; 
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1087; Arango, 879 F.2d at 1501; Fountain, 840 F.2d at 
509. 
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 1. United States v. Killingsworth 
 
In United States v. Killingsworth, the defendant was charged with 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, as well as possession of 
a firearm used in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime.117 The 
district court dismissed the indictment with prejudice for violation of 
the Speedy Trial Act.118 The Seventh Circuit reversed and 
remanded.119 
Killingsworth was indicted on two counts and pled not guilty.120 
However, arraignment on the indictment was never scheduled, and 
Killingsworth did not receive a trial within the time required by the 
Speedy Trial Act.121 Just three days after the Speedy Trial Act deadline 
had passed, Killingsworth filed a motion to dismiss the indictment 
with prejudice.122 During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the 
government put forth two arguments.123 The first was that the 
government had never been required to request an arraignment in a 
criminal case where an individual had already been indicted.124 The 
second was that the government had contacted the magistrate judge’s 
chambers at least twice to inquire about the arraignment but had not 
received a reply.125 The district court stated that the offense was a 
serious one, but that it was impossible to determine if the court or 
government was at fault for the violation.126 The district court 
                                                 
117 507 F.3d at 1087. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 1089. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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ultimately decided to dismiss with prejudice because Killingsworth 
himself was not responsible for the delay.127 
In reviewing the decision, the Seventh Circuit stated that the 
district court undervalued how serious the crime was.128 It also stated 
that the district court “overemphasized Killingsworth’s conduct and 
gave insufficient weight to the fact that the court itself may have been 
at fault for failing to move the case along.”129 The court noted the fact 
that the delay was not intentional on the part of the government and 
that Killingsworth himself stated that he suffered no prejudice.130 The 
court determined that these two factors—absence of bad faith by the 
government and lack of prejudice to the defendant—leaned in favor of 
dismissal without prejudice.131 The Seventh Circuit stated that “the 
purpose of the Act would not be served by requiring the court to 
impose the maximum sanction for a minimum violation” because it 
was a serious offense, the delay was minor, and there was no bad faith 
shown.132 
The district court had also examined the fact that Killingsworth 
was cooperating and just sitting in jail during this period.133 The 
Seventh Circuit stated that whether a defendant was detained pending 
trial was not an explicit factor to consider under the Speedy Trial Act 
and was not its primary focus.134 As a result, the Seventh Circuit 
determined that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing 
the indictment with prejudice.135 The Seventh Circuit then reversed 
the decision of the district court and dismissed the indictment witho
prejudice, stating that “insufficient weight was given to the seriousness 
ut 
                                                 
127 Id. at 1090. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 1091. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 1087. 
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of the offense, the lack of bad faith on the part of the government, and 
the absence of prejudice to Killingsworth.”136   
 
  2. United States v. Arango 
 
In United States v. Arango, the defendant was charged with a 
narcotics offense.137 The district court denied Arango’s motion to 
dismiss the indictment with prejudice.138 The Seventh Circuit found 
no abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court’s decision.139   
                                                
The district court dismissed the indictment against Arango “based 
upon a seventy-two to ninety-three day . . . violation of the Speedy 
Trial Act.”140 In determining whether to dismiss without prejudice, the 
district court analyzed the same three factors that were used in 
Killingsworth.141 On appeal, Arango argued that the district court 
abused its discretion by dismissing without prejudice because of the 
“substantial and prejudicial length of the delay.”142   
In its review, the Seventh Circuit examined the district court’s 
analysis of the three factors.143 It noted that possession of large 
amounts of cocaine is a serious offense.144 In addition, the court stated 
that a three-month delay was not “per se ‘substantial’ enough to justify 
dismissing the charges with prejudice.”145 Arango also failed to show 
any actual prejudice or how the delay impaired his rights.146 The 
Seventh Circuit focused on the fact that the delay was the result of the 
 
136 Id. 
137 879 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1989). 
138 Id. at 1502. 
139 Id. at 1509. 
140 Id. at 1507. 
141 Id. at 1507–08 ((1) whether it was a serious offense, (2) whether the delay 
was minor, and (3) whether there was bad faith). 
142 Id. at 1508. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
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court’s misunderstanding of the status of motions, some of which were 
filed by the defendant.147 The Seventh Circuit stated that because the 
delay was through no fault of the government, “dismissing the 
indictment with prejudice would not serve any purpose of encouraging 
the government to avoid the neglect or bad faith in the prosecution of 
its cases.”148 As a result, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision to dismiss without prejudice.149 
 
3. United States v. Fountain 
 
In United States v. Fountain, the defendant was charged with first-
degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.150 The district court 
dismissed the murder indictment without prejudice.151 The Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.152 
Fountain’s trial was put on hold in an effort to get a witness to the 
murder to testify at his trial.153 The court re-arraigned Fountain, and 
eight days later, he invoked his rights under the Speedy Trial Act.154 
The district court dismissed the indictment without prejudice, and a 
grand jury re-indicted Fountain the same day.155 Fountain argued that 
the Speedy Trial Act only postponed his trial.156 The Seventh Circuit 
partially agreed with him and stated that more time elapsed than if he 
would have “accepted the violation of the Speedy Trial Act 
stoically.”157 Instead, since Fountain’s motion to dismiss took the case 
off the trial calendar and caused a subsequent dismissal and 
                                                 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 1509. 
150 840 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1988). 
151 Id.  
152 Id. at 523. 
153 Id. at 511. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
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reindictment, the trial occurred 209 days after the mandate was 
issued.158  
The Seventh Circuit conceded that a violation of the Speedy Trial 
Act occurred and stated that district courts have broad discretion in 
deciding to dismiss with or without prejudice.159 The Seventh Circuit 
distinguished its approach from that of the other circuits.160 The 
Seventh Circuit noted that its precedent required consideration of all 
the “statutory desiderata” in deciding when to dismiss with or without 
prejudice, while other circuits, such as the Ninth, have held that a 
“‘lackadaisical’ attitude by prosecutors requires dismissal with 
prejudice.”161 In this case, the Seventh Circuit admitted that the 
prosecution was careless, but stated that other statutory factors had to 
be considered as well.162   
The Seventh Circuit “observed that first-degree murder is a grave 
offense,” and that it is important to “deter murder and punish 
murderers” because “murder was a more serious offense than the 
violation of the Speedy Trial Act.”163 The court also noted that a 
“defendant who waits passively while the time runs has less claim to 
dismissal with prejudice than does a defendant who demands, but does 
not receive, prompt attention.”164 In addition, the court observed that 
the delay in this case did not lead to the detriment of Fountain.165 In 
light of all of these factors, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the 
indictment without prejudice.166  
                                                 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 512 (“[R]eview on appeal is deferential.”). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 513. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
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However, after stating its holding, the Seventh Circuit went on to 
express its distaste at how the case proceeded.167 The court focused on 
the fact that Fountain did not have counsel for a significant period of 
time and that counsel may have prevented some of the problems that 
Fountain encountered.168 In addition, the court acknowledged that 
there was no excuse for the prosecution’s neglect of the case.169 The 
Seventh Circuit also stated that if the same problem were to recur, it 
would “not be so easy to chalk it up to inadvertence.”170 
 
4. United States v. Hills 
 
In United States v. Hills, Tylman, Hills, and Winters were indicted 
with “conspiracy to impede the IRS” and for filing false income tax 
returns.171 They were tried in a joint trial in the district court.172 The 
district court found Tylman and Hills guilty of conspiracy, and Hills 
and Winters guilty of filing false tax returns.173 The defendants 
claimed that the district court made various errors, that their statutory 
and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated, and that a 
search had violated their Fourth Amendment rights.174 The Seventh 
Circuit affirmed Tylman’s and Winters’s convictions, vacated Hills’s 
convictions, and remanded.175  
The Seventh Circuit first addressed the defendants’ claim that 
their statutory right to a speedy trial had been violated.176 The 
defendants argued that their right was violated because multiple 
continuances delayed the trial beyond the seventy-day period 
                                                 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 618 F.3d 619, 624 (7th Cir. 2010). 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 625. 
175 Id. at 624. 
176 Id. at 625. 
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prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.177 The Seventh Circuit determined 
that the proper level of review was for abuse of discretion and that a 
showing of actual prejudice was required.178 In reviewing the district 
court’s analysis, the Seventh Circuit examined the excludable days 
exception and stated that “no showing of actual delay in trial is 
required.”179 The court stated that it would follow its established 
precedent, which allowed certain classifications of delay, such as 
pretrial motions, to be automatically excludable.180 The Seventh 
Circuit determined that the district court’s automatic exclusion, based 
on ends-of-justice grounds, was proper in this case.181 
In addition, the Seventh Circuit stated that when a court excludes 
time based on ends-of-justice grounds, it must explain its 
reasoning.182 The Seventh Circuit noted that congestion of a court’s 
trial calendar is not a reason for exclusion on ends-of-justice 
grounds.183 The court established the following as factors to analyze 
when determining whether exclusion based on ends-of-justice grounds 
is proper:  
 
[W]hether failure to grant a continuance would result in a 
miscarriage of justice, whether the case is so complex that 
adequate trial preparation is impossible under the Speedy 
Trial Act’s time limits, and whether the failure to continue 
would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, 
or would deny counsel the time necessary for effective 
preparation.184  
 
                                                 
177 See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006).  
178 Hills, 618 F.3d at 626. 
179 Id.  
180 Id. at 626–27. 
181 Id. (allowing automatic exclusion for pre-trial motions, continuances, and 
on ends-of-justice grounds). 
182 Id. at 628–29. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. (citing Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(C) (2006)).  
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The Seventh Circuit examined the district court’s reasoning for 
granting the continuance, which included the complexity of the case 
and the fact that the defendants would not be greatly prejudiced by a 
delay since they were not in custody.185 The Seventh Circuit 
determined that the district court’s reasoning was sufficient to meet the 
requirements of § 3161 of the Act.186 As a result, the time was 
properly excluded and the court determined that the defendants’ 
Speedy Trial Act cla 187im failed.  
                                                
The defendants also argued that they had a personal right to a 
speedy trial and that Tylman’s counsel could not override their 
decision to exercise that right by filing a motion for a 
continuance.188 The court stated that this argument was without merit 
because “trial tactics have always been within counsel’s province.”189 
Counsel does not have to obtain a defendant’s consent prior to making 
a tactical decision, such as the decision to seek a continuance.190   
The Seventh Circuit also considered the defendants’ constitutional 
right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment.191 The court stated 
that it would review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and 
its factual findings for clear error.192   
The factors analyzed to determine a Sixth Amendment speedy 
trial violation include “whether delay before trial was uncommonly 
long[,] whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to 
blame for that delay[,] whether, in due course, the defendant asserted 
his right to a speedy trial[,] and whether he suffered prejudice as the 
delay’s result.”193 The court also stated that a delay of one year is 
 
185 Id. at 628–29. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 629–30. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 626–28. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Id.  
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presumptively prejudicial.194 While the Speedy Trial Act requires 
defendants to be tried within seventy days,195 this is not a requirement 
in the constitutional analysis. Instead, the constitutional analysis 
focuses more on a presumption of prejudice and if the time that passed 
was reasonable.196 The court determined that there was a presumption 
of prejudice in this case because there was a two-year delay.197   
However, the court determined that the delay was mostly 
attributable to the defendants for the following reasons: the 
continuance was to allow counsel more time to prepare, the delay 
occurred because of the defendants’ difficulty securing counsel, and 
the defendants caused a delay when they incorrectly believed the 
government was withholding information.198 The court also 
determined that the defendants failed to show that they suffered any 
prejudice by the delay.199 A defendant must demonstrate prejudice 
with specificity, and in this case, the defendants did not show that t
defenses were prejudiced.
heir 
                                                
200 In addition, the defendants did not show 
evidence of anxiety or that they were subjected to pretrial 
incarceration.201 As a result, the defendants’ constitutional right to a 
speedy trial was not violated.202 
 
 
194 Id. at 629–30.  
195 Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2006). 
196 Hills, 618 F.3d at 626–28. 
197 Id. at 629–30 (where there was a presumption of prejudice because the trial 
occurred two years after the indictment). 
198 Id. at 630–32. 
199 Id. at 632–33. 
200 Id. at 632 (only two witnesses stated that passage of time affected their 
memories). 
201 Id. at 632–33. 
202 Id.  
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5. United States v. Sykes 
 
In United States v. Sykes, the defendant was convicted on four 
counts of bank robbery in the district court.203 Sykes then filed a 
motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial 
Act.204 The district court dismissed the charges without prejudice and 
ordered Sykes released.205 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision.206   
The same day that the district court dismissed the charges without 
prejudice, a grand jury indicted Skyes for the same four bank 
robberies.207 Sykes disrupted the proceedings, and the judge entered a 
plea of not guilty on his behalf.208 Four days before the trial, Sykes 
moved to dismiss the charges based on his right to a speedy trial (and 
his Fifth Amendment right to meaningful access to the courts).209   
The Seventh Circuit stated that “[t]he Speedy Trial Act generally 
requires a federal criminal trial to begin within seventy days from the 
date the defendant is charged or makes his initial appearance.”210  
However, there are some exclusions to the seventy-day rule that can be 
found in § 3161(h) of the Speedy Trial Act.211 These exclusions allow 
time to be automatically excluded when determining if the time limit 
provided by the Act has been violated.212 “After [seventy] 
nonexcludable days have passed, the Act requires the district court to 
                                                 
203 614 F.3d 303, 305–06 (7th Cir. 2010). 
204 Id. at 307.  
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 305–06. 
207 Id. at 307. 
208 Id. (“[H]e again made some bizarre arguments and otherwise disrupted the 
proceedings. The judge held him in contempt and entered not guilty pleas on his 
behalf.”).  
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 309–10 (citing Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2006)).  
211 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (2006); Sykes, 614 F.3d at 309–10. 
212 Sykes, 614 F.3d at 309–10. 
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dismiss the charges ‘on motion of the defendant.’”213 In this case, 
Sykes made such a motion, and the district court dismissed the 
charges.214   
The Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for 
abuse of discretion, “but under[took] more substantive scrutiny to 
ensure that the judgment [was] supported in terms of the factors 
identified in the statute.”215 The Seventh Circuit reviewed the district 
court’s explanation and analysis of the facts and determined that there 
was not an abuse of discretion.216 The district court correctly 
concluded that the bank robbery charges were “quite serious” and that 
“a dismissal with prejudice would result in ‘a gross miscarriage of 
justice’ given the gravity of the offenses.”217 The district court stated, 
and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that the delay was “‘unconscious’ on 
the part of the government and the court” and instead was a result of 
the actions of Sykes.218 Sykes also waited to claim the Speedy Trial 
Act violation until his motion to dismiss.219 In addition, the Seventh 
Circuit agreed with the district court’s statement that any claim of 
prejudice would be weak because Sykes was “‘largely responsible’ for 
most of the continuances.”220 The Seventh Circuit stated that because 
“Sykes did not bring the delay to the court’s attention as the number of 
nonexcludable days accumulated,” it could justify dismissal without 
prejudice.221 The court noted that “a defendant who waits passively 
while the time runs has less claim to dismissal with prejudice than 
does a defendant who demands, but does not receive, prompt 
                                                 
213 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2)).  
214 Id. 
215 Id. (citing United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 337 (1988)). 
216 Id. at 310. 
217 Id. at 309–10.  
218 Id.  
219 Id.  
220 Id.  
221 Id. at 310.  
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attention.”222 However, there is not a “presumption in favor of 
dismissal without prejudice for violations of the Speedy Trial Act.”223   
The Seventh Circuit also focused on the fact that Sykes had 
repeatedly made frivolous arguments.224 The court stated that while 
the delay was lengthy (224 nonexcludable days), it was only one factor 
to consider.225 A delay of that length does not require dismissal 
without prejudice on its own.226 As a result, the Seventh Circuit agre
with the district court’s analysis of the case and affirmed its decisio
dismiss without prejudice.
ed 
n to 
                                                
227 
 
II. A COMPARISON OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH WITH THE 
APPROACH OF OTHER CIRCUITS AND THE SUPREME COURT 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s approach when analyzing a defendant’s 
constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial is generally 
consistent with the approach of other circuits and the Supreme Court. 
In addition, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of a court’s discretion to 
dismiss with or without prejudice has been in line with that of the 
other courts.  
 
A. The Constitutional Right 
 
The Supreme Court in Barker analyzed four major factors in 
determining if the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial had 
been violated.228 It looked at (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason 
for the delay, (3) whether the defendant asserted his right, and (4) 
 
222 Id. (citing United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 1988)) 
(showing a consistent consideration of a defendant’s assertion of his right in the 
Seventh Circuit). 
223 Id. 
224 Id.  
225 Id.  
226 Id.  
227 Id. at 311–12. 
228 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 
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whether the defendant suffered prejudice.229 The Supreme Court also 
noted the detrimental effect that imprisonment could have on the 
defendant and the possibility that the defendant would use delay as a 
tactic.230  
The Seventh Circuit in Hills evaluated all of the factors laid out in 
Barker.231 In addition to those factors, the court stated that a delay of 
one year was presumptively prejudicial.232 The court put emphasis on 
who was at fault for the delay and the need for the defendant to 
demonstrate prejudice with specificity.233  
 
B. The Statutory Right 
 
The Speedy Trial Act lists multiple periods of delay that are 
excluded when computing the time within which the trial must 
commence.234 These periods of delay are often automatically 
excludable and include pre-trial motions, continuances, and exclusions 
based on ends-of-justice grounds.235 The Fifth Circuit in Gonzalez-
Rodriguez and the Eighth Circuit in Orozco-Osbaldo held that pretrial 
motions are automatically excluded under § 3161(h)(1)(D) of the 
Act.236 According to the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, a violation of the 
Speedy Trial Act does not occur as long as there is prompt disposition 
of the pretrial motion.237 
                                                 
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 520–21. 
231 United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 627 (7th Cir. 2010). 
232 Id. at 629–30. 
233 Id. at 632. 
234 Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(1)–(8) (2006). 
235 Hills, 618 F.3d at 626–27. 
236 United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 621 F.3d 354, 369 (5th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Orozco-Osbaldo, 615 F.3d 955, 957–58 (8th Cir. 2010). 
237 Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 621 F.3d at 369; Orozco-Osbaldo, 615 F.3d at 956–
57. 
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The Supreme Court in Taylor adopted the same factors used for 
the constitutional analysis that were provided in Barker.238 While the 
Seventh Circuit in Hills considered one common factor with Taylor— 
whether the defendant suffered prejudice—its view fell more in line 
with that of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. 
The Seventh Circuit in Hills focused on a need to show actual 
prejudice, but stated that there was no need to show actual delay.239 
The court also noted some situations where time was automatically 
excludable.240 The Seventh Circuit then established factors to 
determine whether it was proper to exclude days based on ends-of-
justice grounds.241 These factors led to the exclusion of additional 
situations, including where (1) there would be a miscarriage of justice, 
(2) the complexity of the case required it, and (3) the case required 
more time (for example, to allow for discovery or to appoint 
counsel).242 However, the court left these exclusions open to 
interpretation by simply stating that a court must explain its reasoning 
when excluding time based on ends-of-justice grounds.243  
 
C. Dismissal With or Without Prejudice 
 
The Speedy Trial Act provides the following factors for courts to 
consider when deciding to dismiss with or without prejudice: “the 
seriousness of the offense[,] the facts and circumstances of the case 
which led to the dismissal[,] and the impact of a reprosecution on the 
administration of [the Act] and on the administration of justice.”244 
However, instead of relying solely on the factors required by the Act, 
the courts have developed their own version of factors to analyze. 
                                                 
238 United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 338–40 (1988). 
239 Hills, 618 F.3d at 626. 
240 Id. at 626–27 (e.g., pretrial motions). 
241 Id. at 628–29 (citing Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(C) (2006)). 
242 Id. 
243 Id. 
244 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). 
 143
30
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 5
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/5
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
 The Supreme Court in Taylor focused on the seriousness of the 
crime, the lackadaisical conduct of the government, and the 
defendant’s failure to appear for trial when determining whether to 
dismiss with or without prejudice.245 The Court also required a finding 
of prejudice to even consider dismissal with prejudice because 
reprosecution is favored if there is no finding of prejudice.246 
Like the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit in Killingsworth 
focused on the seriousness of the crime, whether the defendant 
suffered prejudice, if a detriment to the defendant occurred, and if the 
delay was intentional.247 The Seventh Circuit in Arango focused on 
similar factors, but also considered who was at fault for the delay to be 
an important factor.248 The Seventh Circuit in Fountain took its own 
approach and focused primarily on whether the government was 
careless, if the defendant had asserted his right, and if the defendant 
suffered any detriment.249   
The Seventh Circuit further expanded on these factors in Sykes. 
The court in Sykes focused on the seriousness of the crime, the facts 
and circumstances of the case, whether the defendant suffered 
prejudice, whether the delay was a conscious effort on the part of the 
defendant or the government, whether the defendant asserted his right, 
and the length of the delay.250 This approach seems to mesh together 
the approach required by the Speedy Trial Act with that of the 
Supreme Court and previous cases in the Seventh Circuit. However, 
none of the cases discussed in this Note considered the impact of 
reprosecution,251 as is required by the Speedy Trial Act.252 
                                                 
245 United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 338–40 (1988). 
246 Id. at 341. 
247 United States v. Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 1087, 1090–91 (7th Cir. 2007). 
248 United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1508 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that 
since the delay was the fault of the court, there could be no deterrent effect from 
punishing the prosecution that was not at fault). 
249 United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 512–13 (7th Cir. 1988). 
250 United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 309–10 (7th Cir. 2010). 
251 See supra Parts I.C, I.D, I.E. 
252 See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (2006). 
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III. THE REALITY OF THE RIGHT’S APPLICATION  
 
The Seventh Circuit focuses on the same factors as the Supreme 
Court when determining whether a violation of one’s constitutional 
right to a speedy trial occurred.253 However, the Seventh Circuit 
ignores the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Taylor254 when it 
determines if a violation of the Speedy Trial Act occurred.255 Instead, 
the Seventh Circuit focuses on the excludable days exception.256 The 
Seventh Circuit seems to espouse the idea that considering multiple 
factors can help to protect a defendant’s rights more thoroughly. Its 
application of these factors to determine a constitutional and a 
statutory violation is usually thorough. 
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit’s approach in determining 
whether to dismiss with or without prejudice began as almost identical 
to the Supreme Court’s approach and has expanded with time.257 The 
Seventh Circuit has expanded on the factors laid out in the Speedy 
Trial Act, especially “the facts and circumstances of the case which led 
to the dismissal.”258 The Supreme Court259 and earlier Seventh 
Circuit260 decisions focused on the seriousness of the crime, whether 
the defendant was prejudiced, and if the delay was intentional (or a 
result of laziness by the prosecution).261 However, the Seventh Circuit 
                                                 
253 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 
619, 623–24 (7th Cir. 2010). 
254 See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 338–40 (1988). 
255 See Hills, 618 F.3d at 623–24. 
256 Id. at 626–29. 
257 See generally United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 305–06 (7th Cir. 2010); 
Hills, 618 F.3d at 623–24; United States v. Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 1087 (7th Cir. 
2007); United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Fountain, 840 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1988). 
258 Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (2006). 
259 See Taylor, 487 U.S. at 326.  
260 See Hills, 618 F.3d at 619; Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1087; Arango, 879 
F.2d at 1501; Fountain, 840 F.2d at 509. 
261 See Taylor, 487 U.S. at 338–41; Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1090–91; 
Arango, 879 F.2d at 1508. 
 145
32
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 5
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/5
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
expanded this approach in Sykes by also examining the facts and 
circumstances of the case, who was at fault for the delay, and the 
length of the delay.262 These additional factors provide more insight, 
but lean heavily toward dismissal without prejudice. With regard to 
determining whether to dismiss with or without prejudice, the Seventh 
Circuit may have the more thorough approach (as compared to the 
Supreme Court and other circuits). 
 
IV. IS THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL PROTECTED IN PRACTICE? 
 
While the Seventh Circuit is thorough in its analysis and 
application of multiple factors to determine if a violation of the right to 
a speedy trial has occurred, it may not always come to the correct 
conclusion. The Seventh Circuit is consistent in its analysis of all of 
the necessary factors used to determine if a violation has occurred; 
however, it applies these factors very liberally.263 The court seems to 
imply that a grave violation would have to occur for the defendant to 
receive a meaningful remedy.264 The court has done this by liberally 
applying the excludable days exception in § 3162 of the Speedy Trial 
Act.265 This has been done to the point where it encompasses almost 
every delay caused by either party.266  
The Seventh Circuit in Hills “concluded that Congress intended 
certain classifications of delay to be excludable automatically.”267 This 
automatic exclusion includes time needed to decide pretrial motions, 
the granting of continuances, and exclusions based on ends-of-justice 
grounds.268 As a result, the Seventh Circuit has failed to analyze the 
                                                 
262 United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 309–10 (7th Cir. 2010). 
263 See, e.g., Sykes, 614 F.3d at 305–06; Hills, 618 F.3d at 631–32; 
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1087; Arango, 879 F.2d at 1501; Fountain, 840 F.2d at 
509. 
264 See generally Sykes, 614 F.3d at 305–06; Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1087; 
Arango, 879 F.2d at 1501; Fountain, 840 F.2d at 509. 
265 See id. 
266 See id. 
267 Hills, 618 F.3d at 626. 
268 Id. 
 146
33
Winings: What Does Speed Have to Do with It?: An Analysis of the Seventh C
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
necessity or reasonableness of each exclusion. Instead, the Seventh 
Circuit has simply automatically excluded the classifications of delay 
provided in the Speedy Trial Act and has left the exclusions on ends-
of-justice grounds open for interpretation.269 This has made it difficult 
for the defendant to claim a violation because most classifications of 
delay are easily excludable under the Speedy Trial Act.  
This approach by the Seventh Circuit does not promote the 
purpose of the Sixth Amendment, which was “(1) to prevent 
oppressive pretrial incarceration[,] (2) to minimize anxiety and 
concern of the accused[,] and (3) to limit the possibility that defense 
will be impaired.”270 The purpose of the right is frustrated when 
lengthy delays are disguised under excludable exceptions. In addition, 
the Seventh Circuit has completely ignored one purpose of the Sixth 
Amendment—prevention of oppressive pre-trial incarceration.271 The 
Seventh Circuit consistently has been only concerned with delay being 
used as a tactic by the defendant, and it has consciously ignored 
lengthy pre-trial incarceration.272 This is a result of the exclusions of 
the Speedy Trial Act not being applied to meet the purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment.  
Even if the days are not excludable, the defendant’s right is often 
not protected. In cases where the court admits that a violation of the 
right to a speedy trial has occurred, it often decides that the defendant 
still did not suffer prejudice.273 The court requires the level of 
prejudice to be extremely high before it will consider the violation to 
be prejudicial.  
This means that even if the Seventh Circuit determines that a 
violation that warrants dismissal did occur, the defendant is still on an 
                                                 
269 See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(1)(A)–(H) (2006) (listing the 
excludable days); Hills, 618 F.3d at 626. 
270 Hills, 618 F.3d at 631–32 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
271 See id. 
272 See id. at 628–29, 632–33; United States v. Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 1087, 
1091 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that incarceration is not a focus). 
273 See generally United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 305–06 (7th Cir. 2010); 
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1087; United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1501 (7th 
Cir. 1989); United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 509 (7th Cir. 1988) 
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uphill climb. Without a finding of prejudice to the defense, the court is 
unlikely to dismiss with prejudice.274 The Seventh Circuit has 
repeatedly dismissed these types of claims without prejudice, even 
when the delays have been lengthy and at the fault of the 
prosecution.275 When the court dismisses without prejudice, the 
defendant does not receive a meaningful remedy. While some cases, 
and even the Speedy Trial Act, consider dismissal without prejudice a 
sanction,276 it is unlikely that a defendant would consider this a 
meaningful remedy. The defendant will often be reprosecuted and in 
the end has only delayed the inevitable.277  This does not provide a 
remedy or a proper sanction for the violation.  
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit, along with the Supreme Court 
and other circuits, seem to gloss over who is to blame for the delay,278 
making this factor less important than it was meant to be. It makes 
sense to hold the defendant accountable for any delays he caused; 
however, other delays not caused by the defendant should be 
                                                 
274 See Hills, 618 F.3d at 628–33; Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1090; Arango, 
879 F.2d at 1508. 
275 See Fountain, 840 F.2d at 512–13. 
276 Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2); Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1091 
(considering dismissal without prejudice as a sanction); United States v. Lauderdale, 
No. 06-cr-30142-MJR, 2007 WL 1100617, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2007) (stating 
that “dismissal without prejudice is ‘not a completely negligible sanction, viewed 
from a deterrent standpoint, since the grand jury may refuse to reindict and since 
even if it does the defendant may be acquitted.’”). 
277 See Fountain, 840 F.2d at 512–13. 
278 See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 328, 343 (1988) (where slow 
processing by the court and government occurred and there was a lackadaisical 
attitude on the part of the government); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 516–17 
(1972) (where there were more than sixteen continuances granted); United States v. 
Orozco-Osbaldo, 615 F.3d 955, 957–58 (8th Cir. 2010) (allowing all days needed to 
decide pre-trial motions to be excluded); United States v. Boyd, 392 F. App’x 595, 
597 (9th Cir. 2010) (allowing delay because it was caused in good faith by the state); 
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1089–90 (stating that it is impossible to determine if the 
court or government was at fault for the delay and that the delay was unintentional); 
Fountain, 840 F.2d at 513 (expressing distaste at how the case proceeded because of 
the prosecution’s neglect of the case).  
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attributable to the prosecution.279 It should not matter if the court or 
the prosecutor was responsible for the unreasonable delay.280 No 
matter which is at fault (as long as it is not the defendant), the 
defendant’s right has been unjustly violated. If the defendant is not 
responsible for the delay, it makes sense to hold the prosecution liable 
for that delay and to recognize a violation of the defendant’s right. The 
defendant deserves an adequate remedy when he has suffered a loss of 
his rights, and the prosecution should be deterred from allowing any 
future violations. 
In addition, the fact that the delay was unintentional should not be 
considered.281 The notion that the prosecution did not intentionally 
violate the defendant’s rights should have no bearing on the court’s 
decision. It matters that the defendant’s rights were violated, not that 
the prosecution did not intentionally let it happen. Laziness on the part 
of the prosecution should favor the defendant and lean toward a 
finding that a violation of the defendant’s rights occurred.282 
While the Seventh Circuit often claims policy reasons for its 
approach of dismissing without prejudice,283 the policy reasons behind 
the Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment do not support the court’s 
approach. It is true that one of the Seventh Circuit’s policy 
considerations is to protect the public and to prevent the impairment of 
the deterrent effect of punishment,284 but other policy considerations 
                                                 
279 See Barker, 407 U.S. at 529–30 (stating that it is proper to put the burden of 
ensuring a speedy trial on the prosecution). 
280 See United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1508 (7th Cir. 1989) (where 
the court unreasonably differentiated between the court and prosecution being at 
fault). 
281 See generally United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 305–06 (7th Cir. 2010); 
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1087; Arango, 879 F.2d at 1501; Fountain, 840 F.2d at 
509. 
282 See Fountain, 840 F.2d at 512–13 (“We therefore inquire not whether the 
prosecution was careless (it was), but whether the district judge made a reasoned 
decision in light of the statutory criteria.” Even though the prosecution was careless, 
“the district court was entitled to dismiss the indictment without prejudice.”). 
283 Anne E. Melley, Annotation, Construction and Application of the Speedy 
Trial Act, 46 A.L.R. FED. 2D 129 § 3 (2010). 
284 Id. 
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deal with the denial of the defendant’s liberty.285 Another function of 
the Speedy Trial Act is to hold the prosecution accountable for its 
actions and to ensure that the government does not ignore a case or 
leave a defendant in prison awaiting trial for an unreasonable amount 
of time.286 None of these policy reasons are met when the defendant is 
not tried in an expeditious manner or when the defendant is not 
provided a remedy. The prosecution receives no punishment for 
violating the defendant’s rights if it can simply bring the case against 
the defendant again.287 Justice is not served, and the defendant loses 
his liberty. It is important for the court to balance the threat that the 
defendant poses to society against a protection of the defendant’s 
rights. The Seventh Circuit has not struck this balance because it 
seems to require an extraordinary violation to even consider dismissal 
with prejudice.288 
The Seventh Circuit has stated additional public policy reasons for 
why it rarely dismisses with prejudice, such as the theory that it is 
better to deny a criminal his rights than to let him walk free.289 While 
it may be true that society would be safer and that many citizens 
would probably prefer that the defendant not walk free, the court has 
missed the point. While public policy should, and does, shape our laws 
and the way they are applied, our Founding Fathers established certain 
                                                 
285 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972); see United States v. Hills, 618 
F.3d 619, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (listing the 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment: “(1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration[,] 
(2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused[,] and (3) to limit the possibility 
that defense will be impaired.”). 
286 See id. 
287 See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (2006) (including dismissal 
with or without prejudice as a sanction); United States v. Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 
1087, 1091 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Courts view dismissal without prejudice as a 
sanction.”).  
288 See generally United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303 (7th Cir. 2010); 
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1087; United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 
1989); United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1988). 
289 See Fountain, 840 F.2d at 512.  
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rights that were considered fundamental290 and were to be left 
untouched and unlimited. This means that the Speedy Trial Act should 
be interpreted in a way that promotes the purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment.  
With the way that the Seventh Circuit currently applies the 
Speedy Trial Act, the defendant can actually benefit from not asserting 
his right to a speedy trial.291 The defendant may actually end up being 
detained longer by asserting his right because if the court determines 
that no violation occurred, the defendant would have been detained the 
entire time that the court is making that decision. In addition, after the 
court determines that a violation did not occur, the trial continues. 
Even if the court determines that the defendant’s rights were violated, 
it can end up making the process longer and more strenuous for the 
defendant because he is often subject to reprosecution.292 This was not 
the intent of the Speedy Trial Act or the Sixth Amendment;293 as a 
result, a better process must emerge. 
 
V. CHANGE IS REQUIRED 
 
The defects discussed above have created negative effects on the 
rights of defendants in the Seventh Circuit. There are some technical 
issues with the court’s approach, as well as some possibly unintended 
consequences. 
One technical issue is the lack of a well thought out standard in 
the Seventh Circuit with regard to the use of the excludable days 
exception. The courts’ ability to exclude days based on ends-of-justice 
grounds294 could result in unintended consequences. The court can 
exclude days if it can show that the reasons for granting the 
                                                 
290 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529–30 (stating that the right to a speedy trial is a 
fundamental right).  
291 See Fountain, 840 F.2d at 511. 
292 See id. (where the trial was longer—delayed 209 days—because the 
defendant asserted that a violation occurred). 
293 United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2010). 
294 See id. at 628–29. 
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continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the 
defendant.295 This exclusion is open-ended and gives the court the 
opportunity to expand it far beyond the intent of the legislature. Since 
the right to a speedy trial is protected by the Constitution296 and the 
Speedy Trial Act,297 it is one that is considered important and 
fundamental.298 This would seem to imply that other interests should 
almost never outweigh the defendant’s right to a speedy trial. In 
addition, the public has an interest in a guilty defendant being tried 
and sentenced quickly and efficiently.299 While there may be occasions 
when one party needs more time for discovery or preparation,300 this 
should not be looked at lightly. The parties should be required to 
adhere to the deadlines imposed by the court. Excluding days on ends-
of-justice grounds should only be used in limited circumstances that 
should be better outlined by Congress in the Speedy Trial Act. 
Another possible unintended consequence results from an 
attorney’s ability to make a tactical decision.301 The defendant’s 
attorney has the authority to make decisions regarding the progression 
of the case.302 While the defendant has the right to decide to testify, to 
plead guilty or not guilty, and to settle, the defendant’s attorney has the 
right to make decisions regarding which motions to file.303 In effect, 
this means that the defense attorney could unnecessarily delay the 
case. If the defendant tried to claim a violation, he would likely fail 
because the court would attribute the delay to the defendant.304 This is 
                                                 
295 Id. 
296 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
297 Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006). 
298 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–30 (1972). 
299 Melley, supra note 283, at § 3 (“to serve the public interest by . . . reducing 
a defendant’s opportunity to commit crimes while on pretrial release.”). 
300 See Hills, 618 F.3d at 626–30 (tactical decisions, including continuances, 
are within counsel’s discretion). 
301 See id. at 626–28. 
302 Id. 
303 Id. 
304 See Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1287 (2009).   
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because any action of the defendant’s counsel is attributed to the 
defendant.305 As a result, as long as the defense counsel can justify his 
decision as reasonable, he could unnecessarily delay the case, and the 
defendant would not be afforded a remedy.  
Lastly, delay seems to be the only result of a recognized violation 
of the right to a speedy trial. In one case, the court noted that the 
defendant’s trial was lengthened by the assertion of his right to a 
speedy trial.306 A defendant’s assertion of a violation of his rights 
should not lengthen or further delay the process. However, because the 
courts almost always dismiss without prejudice,307 the case is simply 
brought again. This means that the only effect of the defendant’s 
assertion of his right is to delay his conviction or acquittal. It may be 
better for the defendant to just accept the violation of his right and 
allow the trial to continue, instead of start all over again.308 A better 
remedy should be provided if this is going to be the continued 
approach. Otherwise, the only remedy is for the court to recognize the 
violation of the defendant’s right and for the defendant to be charged 
again.309 When this occurs, the defendant does not gain anything from 
asserting his right.  
 
                                                 
305 See id. 
306 United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1988). 
307 See, e.g., United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 305–06 (7th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 1087, 1091 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Arango, 879 
F.2d 1501, 1509 (7th Cir. 1989); Fountain, 840 F.2d at 509, 513. 
308 See Fountain, 840 F.2d at 511 (more time passed before trial than if the 
defendant had not asserted his right to a speedy trial). 
309 See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (2006) (including dismissal 
with or without prejudice as a sanction); Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1091 (“Courts 
view dismissal without prejudice as a sanction.”). 
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VI. A NEW APPROACH TO THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT 
 
With all the faults of the Seventh Circuit’s current approach to the 
Speedy Trial Act, a new bright-line rule must be established. While it 
is very difficult to establish the exact circumstances in which a 
violation occurs or in which a case should be dismissed with prejudice, 
a better standard than the one currently in place must emerge. One’s 
right to a speedy trial is protected by the Constitution,310 and this in 
and of itself shows the importance of the right to each individual.  
In addition, besides protecting the defendant, the Speedy Trial Act 
also helps protect the public.311 One way in which the Act helps 
protect the public is by ensuring that the defendant is tried in an 
expeditious manner.312 The public interest is best served when the 
defendant is brought to justice in a timely and efficient manner.313 The 
defendant benefits because his constitutional and statutory right is 
protected and he does not have to endure unnecessary pre-trial 
incarceration. As a result, it is important to both the public and the 
defendant that a better way to assess the right to a speedy trial is 
developed. 
One necessary step is to stop lengthy delays that are not the fault 
of the defendant.314 Even if the defendant’s case is not prejudiced (for 
example, by a witness’s loss of memory or similar situations), the 
defendant has still suffered harm. The defendant has a right to a 
speedy trial,315 and if the court does not enforce that right, he has 
suffered prejudice because his fundamental right has been limited.316 
                                                 
310 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
311 Melley, supra note 283, at § 3.  
312 Id. 
313 Id. (“to serve the public interest by . . . reducing a defendant’s opportunity 
to commit crimes while on pretrial release.”). 
314 This should partly be accomplished by limiting the excludable days 
exception. See supra Parts IV & V. 
315 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.; Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3162 
(2006). 
316 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–30 
(1972). 
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The Seventh Circuit in Hills stated that “delays approaching one year 
[are] presumptively prejudicial”;317 however, the court has not applied 
that presumption in its recent cases. The court should enforce the one-
year threshold when determining if the defendant has been prejudiced. 
Any delay that is not attributable to the defendant and that is one year 
or longer would automatically show that the defendant has suffered 
prejudice. This finding of prejudice should then be considered with 
regard to choosing to dismiss with or without prejudice.  
It is also important for the court to strike a balance between 
dismissing with and without prejudice. If a court recognizes that a 
defendant’s rights have been violated, the defendant still has no 
meaningful remedy unless the court chooses to dismiss with prejudice. 
If the court dismisses without prejudice, the defendant could be 
retried, and the offending party receives no punishment for its 
violation.318 While dismissal with prejudice should not be used 
liberally, it should at least be considered. 
One solution is to afford the defendant a remedy through a civil 
suit.319 If the defendant’s rights have been violated, he could take 
action by suing the party that caused the delay. This would give the 
defendant an opportunity to get monetary compensation for the 
violation. However, this remedy would only compensate one group 
that the Speedy Trial Act was meant to protect. The Speedy Trial Act 
was enacted to protect the defendant, as well as to protect the public 
interest.320 A civil suit would compensate the defendant for a 
deprivation of his rights; however, it would not compensate the public 
for a violation of its rights. The public has an interest in quickly trying 
                                                 
317United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 2010).  
318 See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (including dismissal with or without prejudice 
as a sanction); United States v. Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 1087, 1091 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“Courts view dismissal without prejudice as a sanction.”); United States v. 
Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1988) (where the defendant was indicted 
again). 
319 Possibly a civil suit grounded in negligence or a malpractice action against 
counsel. 
320 Melley, supra note 283, at § 3.   
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and sentencing guilty defendants,321 and this remedy does not address 
that interest. In addition, this solution does not deter future violations 
because the individuals at fault are not likely to be held responsible. 
The larger entity that employs the individual would probably pay for 
any damages awarded.322 In order for monetary compensation to be an 
effective remedy and deter future violations, the individual at fault 
must be held responsible, and the interests of the defendant and of the 
public must be addressed. Since the proper party is not likely to be 
held responsible and the remedy does not benefit both parties suffering 
from the violation, a different approach may better serve the ends of 
justice. 
The best solution may be to sanction the individual responsible 
for each violation.323 There is a long-standing sentiment to put the 
burden of ensuring a speedy trial on the prosecutors.324 It is practical 
to put the responsibility on the lawyers because they are in the best 
position to expedite the case by filing fewer motions and by speaking 
to the judge. If a lawyer were held responsible for his failure to abide 
by constitutional and statutory law, it may provide an incentive for him 
to efficiently expedite the process.  
The Speedy Trial Act allows sanctions to be imposed on lawyers 
for conscious delay of trial.325 The Act allows the court to sanction the 
attorney at fault for the delay by reducing the amount of compensation 
paid to the attorney, imposing a fine, denying the attorney the right to 
practice before the court for a period of time, or filing a report with a 
                                                 
321 See id. (interest stems from a need to reduce a “defendant’s opportunity to 
commit crimes while on pretrial release and preventing extended pretrial delay from 
impairing the deterrent effect of punishment.”) 
322 If the employee was acting within the course of employment, the employer 
would be liable under the theory of respondeat superior. 
323 See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(b) (2006) (listing sanctions for counsel). 
324 United States v. Lauderdale, No. 06-cr-30142-MJR, 2007 WL 1100617, at 
*4 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2007) (“This rule reflects the long-held sentiment that the 
ultimate responsibility to ensure the prosecution of individuals is done legally and in 
a way that does not violate their rights should rest on the shoulders of those doing 
the prosecuting.”). 
325 18 U.S.C. § 3162(b). 
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disciplinary committee.326 However, the Seventh Circuit has only 
discussed dismissal with or without prejudice as a sanction327 and has 
not discussed sanctioning a lawyer under § 3162(b).328 In Fountain, 
the court readily admitted that the lawyers were lackadaisical and at 
fault; however, it did not sanction those individuals.329 If the case was 
handled poorly enough for the court to mention it in its opinion,330 
sanctions may be warranted. If the lawyer handled the case poorly 
once, he may handle it poorly again.  
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Carlone stated that 
“[c]ourts . . . have broad and flexible powers to prevent the abuse of 
their processes.”331 The Seventh Circuit stated that “[a]lternative 
sanctions are available that do not involve . . . windfalls for law 
breakers.”332 The court stated that these alternatives included revoking 
or shortening continuances (only prospectively) or refusing to grant 
future continuances.333 The Seventh Circuit should continue to build 
on these alternative sanctions with the sanctions provided in § 3162(b) 
of the Speedy Trial Act.  
                                                 
326 Id. §§ 3162(b)(4)(A)–(E). 
327 See United States v. Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 1087, 1091 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(considering dismissal without prejudice as a sanction); Lauderdale, 2007 WL 
1100617, at *5 (“dismissal without prejudice is ‘not a completely negligible 
sanction, viewed from a deterrent standpoint, since the grand jury may refuse to 
reindict and since even if it does the defendant may be acquitted.’”). 
328 See generally United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303 (7th Cir. 2010); 
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 1087; United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 
1989); United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1988). 
329 See Fountain, 840 F.2d at 513. 
330 See id. 
331 666 F.2d 1112, 1115–16 (7th Cir. 1981). 
332 Id. (referring to the fact that dismissal with prejudice punishes “not only the 
prosecutor but the entire law-abiding public” because it forever precludes the 
government from trying defendants that have been accused of serious crimes). 
333 Id. 
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If the court held the responsible party liable, as the statute 
provides for,334 it may help to protect the defendant’s rights. A 
violation is less likely if counsel knows that he could be required to 
pay a fine or be prohibited from practicing for a period of time.335 If 
the individuals are sanctioned, the defendant may feel like his right has 
been recognized and that the person responsible for the deprivation of 
that right has been held accountable. Sanctioning the lawyer who is at 
fault for the delay would also hold him responsible to the public for 
failure to try the defendant in an efficient and expedient manner. 
Sanctions would act as a deterrent in future cases because violators 
would know that there were consequences to their actions. In addition, 
sanctions are an attractive option because they do not prevent 
criminals from being punished “as a by-product of trying to prevent 
misconduct by government officers.”336 As a result, the public is still 
protected because sanctions allow the criminal to still be punished. 
Sanctions could also deter the unnecessary expansion of the 
excludable days exception. If these exceptions are applied more 
conservatively, attorneys will not be able to hide under its expansive 
umbrella. Attorneys would not be able to designate as many forms of 
delay as excludable, which would cause them to be more cautious in 
the case proceedings. This would help to expedite the case because 
attorneys would not unnecessarily delay the trial for fear of sanctions. 
In addition, there would be less concern for abuse of tactical 
decisions made by attorneys. Attorneys are allowed to make tactical 
decisions without approval of their clients;337 this includes requesting 
continuances.338 If sanctions can be awarded for unnecessary delay, 
attorneys would be less likely to abuse their authority to make these 
decisions. Sanctions would deter a defense attorney from requesting 
unnecessary continuances. 
                                                 
334 Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162(b) (2006). 
335 Id. §§ 3162(b)(4)(B)–(D) (providing for fines and denial of the right to 
practice). 
336 Carlone, 666 F.2d at 1115–16. 
337 United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 626–28 (7th Cir. 2010). 
338 Id. 
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There would also be less concern about the ability to reprosecute 
the defendant if the trial were conducted according to the requirements 
of the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act. Sanctions could 
help deter delays, which would result in quicker trials and less 
violations. 
Allowing the court to administer sanctions may be the most 
appropriate and efficient approach because the Speedy Trial Act 
already allows courts to do so.339 The court is well-versed in how and 
why the delay occurred, and therefore, it may be able to impose 
sanctions more quickly. In addition, the court will likely know who is 
truly at fault for the delay; therefore, it will be easier for it to provide 
justice to the victim of the violation.  
More defined guidelines for imposing these sanctions must be 
defined in the Speedy Trial Act.340 The Act currently allows sanctions 
 
In any case in which counsel for the defendant or the attorney 
for the Government (1) knowingly allows the case to be set 
for trial without disclosing the fact that a necessary witness 
would be unavailable for trial; (2) files a motion solely for the 
purpose of delay which he knows is totally frivolous and 
without merit; (3) makes a statement for the purpose of 
obtaining a continuance which he knows to be false and 
which is material to the granting of a continuance; or (4) 
otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without 
justification consistent with section 3161 . . .341  
 
This seems to allow sanctions only when counsel has intentionally, 
knowingly, or willfully delayed the trial.342 This unnecessarily limits 
the applicability of the sanctions provided by the Speedy Trial Act. 
                                                 
339 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3162(b)(4)(E)–(c) (“The authority to punish provided for 
by this subsection shall be in addition to any other authority or power available to 
such court.”). 
340 See id. §§ 3162(b)(4)(A)–(E) (listing the current sanctions). 
341 Id. § 3162(b). 
342 See id. 
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There may be situations where counsel is lackadaisical in his duties,343 
and while he does not intend to delay the trial, that is the direct result 
of his actions. In that situation, counsel is just as much at fault for the 
delay as if he willfully caused the delay. The Speedy Trial Act should 
expand its scope344 to allow sanctions for attorneys who unnecessarily 
neglect the case, both intentionally and unintentionally. This would 
provide a greater deterrent from violations and would hold counsel 
accountable for his duties.  
The drawback of this remedy lies in what would occur if the court 
were at fault for the delay. It is unlikely that a judge will sanction 
himself; however, the Code of Conduct for United States Judges may 
provide for disciplinary action.345 The Code states that “[a] judge 
should dispose promptly of the business of the court.”346 This puts an 
obligation on the court to ensure that trials are conducted in an 
expeditious manner. In addition, the Code requires judges with 
supervisory authority to ensure that those under their control perform 
their duties “timely and effectively.”347 As a result, judges have an 
affirmative duty to ensure that the case is promptly decided, and 
supervisory judges have a duty to discipline judges that do not fulfill 
this duty.348 While the burden to ensure a speedy trial should still be 
placed on the prosecution, the Code provides a backup to ensure that 
the responsible party is punished.  
                                                 
343 See United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating 
that the prosecution neglected the case). 
344  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3162(b)(4)(E)–(c) (“The authority to punish provided for 
by this subsection shall be in addition to any other authority or power available to 
such court.”). 
345 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, vol. 2, ch. 2, at canon 3,  
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/ 
conduct/Vol02A-Ch02.pdf. 
346 Id. at canon 3(A)(5) (with commentary stating that judges are to reduce 
avoidable delays and ensure that lawyers cooperate). 
347 Id. at canon 3(B)(4) (“A judge with supervisory authority over other judges 
should take reasonable measures to ensure that they perform their duties timely and 
effectively.”). 
348 Id. at canons 3(A)(5), 3(B)(4). 
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 There is no perfect remedy for the defendant; however, it is 
important for the court to find a balance between the defendant’s rights 
and the interests of the public. It is important for the court to protect 
society by ensuring that criminals end up in prison; however, this 
cannot be done without regard to the defendant’s constitutional and 
statutory rights. The court must find a balance that best promotes the 
imprisonment of criminals, as well as the purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act.349 The Founders believed that 
the right to a speedy trial was so essential that they included it in the 
Constitution.350 Congress then strengthened this right through the 
Speedy Trial Act.351 This means that the court should show deference 
to the intentions of the Founders and of Congress. The court must do 
its part to protect and balance the interests and the rights of the 
defendant and the public. This balance is best met through the use of 
sanctions, as explained above.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Seventh Circuit has a long uphill climb if it is going to find a 
way to protect defendants’ rights the way that they were intended to be 
protected by the Founding Fathers and Congress. While the Seventh 
Circuit is not out of line with the approach taken by the Supreme 
Court, that does not mean it is the best approach. The Seventh Circuit 
needs to take the initiative and take the first step toward striking that 
necessary balance between the interests of society and the rights of the 
defendant. This is not likely to happen unless the Seventh Circuit 
reduces the number of situations where excludable days are applicable 
and cuts down on the ability to expand these exclusions. Sanctions on 
the responsible individual provide the best remedy by deterring similar 
conduct in the future and still allowing criminals to be punished. The 
deterrent factor in turn protects the defendant by reducing the number 
of violations and lengthy delays. The Seventh Circuit should focus on 
                                                 
349 See United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2010). 
350 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
351 See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006). 
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effectively balancing the constitutional and statutory rights of 
individuals and the public. The Seventh Circuit should take the 
initiative and develop a new approach that establishes this balance 
through the use of sanctions on individuals. 
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